1-06-1714
3
The trial court held hearings on the Duane Morris and Mayer Brown fee petitions in March
2006. The Duane Morris petition was for services to Paulette as executor of the estate from
August 8, 2002, to December 31, 2002. The Mayer Brown petition was for services to Paulette as
executor from January 15, 2003, to March 21, 2006. It is undisputed that Mayer Brown continued
to provide services to the estate after March 21, 2006. The trial court in a written order dated May
10, 2006, granted some but not all of the fees and costs in the Duane Morris and Mayer Brown
petitions. The order did not include the language in Supreme Court Rule 304 (210 Ill. 2d R. 304),
stating that the order was appealable.
Margaret appeals. She argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the
trial court lost jurisdiction in 2003 by granting Quinlan's SOJ motion on its fee petition without
transferring the entire estate case to a different judge. She maintains that because the entire estate
case was not transferred, all orders entered by the trial court after it granted Quinlan's SOJ are
void under the reasoning in McCann v. Presswood, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 721 N.E. 2d 811
(1999).
Substitutions of judge are governed by section 2-1001 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001
(West 2006). Section 2-1001(a)(2)(i) provides: "Each party shall be entitled to one substitution of
judge without cause as a matter of right." 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2)(i) (West 2006). Section 2-
1001(c) provides: "[w]hen a substitution of judge is granted, the case may be assigned to some
other judge in the same county, or in some other convenient county." (Emphasis added.) 735
ILCS 5/2-1001(c) (West 2006). Margaret argues that by using "the case," the legislature meant
that only entire cases, not one portion of a case like the Quinlan fee issue, can be transferred under
